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Abstract. At CRYPTO 2013, Boneh and Zhandry initiated the study of
quantum-secure encryption. They proposed first indistinguishability def-
initions for the quantum world where the actual indistinguishability only
holds for classical messages, and they provide arguments why it might
be hard to achieve a stronger notion. In this work, we show that stronger
notions are achievable, where the indistinguishability holds for quantum
superpositions of messages. We investigate exhaustively the possibilities
and subtle differences in defining such a quantum indistinguishability
notion for symmetric-key encryption schemes. We justify our stronger
definition by showing its equivalence to novel quantum semantic-security
notions that we introduce. Furthermore, we show that our new security
definitions cannot be achieved by a large class of ciphers – those which
are quasi-preserving the message length. On the other hand, we pro-
vide a secure construction based on quantum-resistant pseudorandom
permutations; this construction can be used as a generic transformation
for turning a large class of encryption schemes into quantum indistin-
guishable and hence quantum semantically secure ones. Moreover, our
construction is the first completely classical encryption scheme shown to
be secure against an even stronger notion of indistinguishability, which
was previously known to be achievable only by using quantum messages
and arbitrary quantum encryption circuits.
1 Introduction
Quantum computers [20] threaten many cryptographic schemes. By using Shor’s
algorithm [22] and its variants [25], an adversary in possession of a quantum com-
puter can break the security of every scheme based on factorization and discrete
logarithms, including RSA, ElGamal, elliptic-curve primitives and many oth-
ers. Moreover, longer keys and output lengths are required in order to maintain
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the security of block ciphers and hash functions [5,12]. These difficulties led to
the development of post-quantum cryptography [2], i.e., classical cryptography
resistant against quantum adversaries.
When modeling the security of cryptographic schemes, care must be taken in
defining exactly what property one wants to achieve. In classical security mod-
els, all parties and communications are classical. When these notions are used
to prove post-quantum security, one must consider adversaries having access to
a quantum computer. This means that, while the communication between the
adversary and the user is still classical, the adversary might carry out computa-
tions on a quantum computer.
Such post-quantum notions of security turn out to be unsatisfying in certain
scenarios. For instance, consider quantum adversaries able to use quantum super-
positions of messages
∑
x αx |x〉 instead of classical messages when communicat-
ing with the user, even though the cryptographic primitive is still classical. This
kind of scenario is considered, e.g., in [4,8,23,26,28]. Such a setting might for
example occur in a situation where one party using a quantum computer encrypts
messages for another party that uses a classical computer and an adversary is
able to observe the outcome of the quantum computation before measurement.
Other examples are an attacker which is able to trick a classical device into
showing quantum behavior, or a classical scheme which is used as subprotocol in
a larger quantum protocol. Another possibility occurs when using obfuscation.
There are applications where one might want to distribute the obfuscated code
of a symmetric-key encryption scheme (with the secret key hardcoded) in order
to allow a third party to generate ciphertexts without being able to retrieve the
key - think of this as building public-key encryption from symmetric-key encryp-
tion using Indistinguishability Obfuscation. Because in these cases an adversary
receives the classical code for producing encryptions, he could implement the
code on his local quantum computer and query the resulting quantum circuit
on a superposition of inputs. Moreover, even in quantum reductions for classical
schemes situations could arise where superposition access is needed. A typical
example are impossibility results (such as meta-reductions [7]), where giving the
adversary additional power often rules out a broader range of secure reductions.
Notions covering such settings are often called quantum-security notions. In this
work we propose new quantum-security notions for encryption schemes.
For encryption, the notion of semantic security [10,11] has been traditionally
used. This notion models in abstract terms the fact that, without the correspond-
ing decryption key, it is impossible not only to correctly decrypt a ciphertext,
but even to recover any non-trivial information about the underlying plaintext.
The exact definition of semantic security is cumbersome to work with in secu-
rity proofs as it is simulation-based. Therefore, the simpler notion of ciphertext
indistinguishability has been introduced. This notion is given in terms of an
interactive game where an adversary has to distinguish the encryptions of two
messages of his choice. The advantage of this definition is that it is easier to
work with than (but equivalent to) semantic security.
To the best of our knowledge, no quantum semantic-security notions for
classical encryption schemes have been proposed so far. For indistinguishability,
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Boneh and Zhandry introduced indistinguishability notions for quantum-secure
encryption under chosen-plaintext attacks in a recent work [4]. They consider a
model (IND-qCPA) where a quantum adversary can query the encrypting device
in superposition during a learning phase but is limited to classical communica-
tion during the actual challenge phase. However, in the symmetric-key scenario,
this approach has the following shortcoming: If we assume that an adversary
can get quantum access in a learning phase, it seems unreasonable to assume
that he cannot get such access when the actual message of interest is encrypted.
Boneh and Zhandry showed that a seemingly natural notion of quantum indis-
tinguishability is unachievable. In order to restore a meaningful definition, they
resorted to the compromise of IND-qCPA.
Our Contributions. In this paper we achieve two main results. On the one
hand, we initiate the study of semantic security in the quantum world, pro-
viding new definitions and a thorough discussion about the motivations and
difficulties of modeling these notions correctly. This study is concluded by a
suitable definition of quantum semantic security under chosen plaintext attacks
(qSEM-qCPA). On the other hand, we extend the fundamental work initiated
in [4] in finding suitable notions of indistinguishability in the quantum world.
We show that the compromise that had to be reached there in order to define
an achievable notion instead of a more natural one (i.e., IND-qCPA vs. fqIND-
qCPA) can be overcome – although not trivially. We show how various other
possible notions of quantum indistinguishability can be defined. All these secu-
rity notions span a tree of possibilities which we analyze exhaustively in order
to find the most suitable definition of quantum indistinguishability under chosen
plaintext attacks (qIND-qCPA). We prove this notion to be achievable, strictly
stronger than IND-qCPA, and equivalent to qSEM-qCPA, thereby completing
an elegant framework of security notions in the quantum world, see Fig. 2 below
for an overview.
Furthermore, we formally define the notion of a core function and quasi–
length-preserving ciphers – encryption schemes which essentially do not increase
the plaintext size, such as stream ciphers and many block ciphers including AES –
and we show the impossibility of achieving our new security notion for this kind
of schemes. While this impossibility might look worrying from an application
perspective, we also present a transformation that turns a block cipher into
an encryption scheme fulfilling our notion. This transformation also works in
respect to an even stronger notion of indistinguishability in the quantum world,
which was introduced in [6], and previously only known to be achievable in
the setting of computational quantum encryption, that is, the scenario where all
the parties have quantum computing capabilities, and encryption is performed
through arbitrary quantum circuits operating on quantum data. Even if this
scenario goes in a very different direction from the scope of our work, it is
interesting to note that our construction is the first fully classical scheme secure
even in respect to such a purely quantum notion of security.
Related Work. The idea of considering scenarios where a quantum adver-
sary can force other parties into quantum behaviour has been first considered
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in [8]. Attacks exploiting classical encryptions in quantum superposition have
been described in [13,16,17,21]. In [4] the authors also consider the security
of signature schemes where the adversary can have quantum access to a sign-
ing oracle. Quantum superposition queries have also been investigated relatively
to the random oracle model [3]. Another quantum indistinguishability notion
has been suggested (but not further analyzed) by Velema in [24]. Prior work has
considered the security of quantum methods to encrypt classical data in the com-
putational setting [15,27]. In concurrent and independent work, Broadbent and
Jeffery [6] introduce indistinguishability notions for the public- and secret-key
encryption of quantum messages in the context of fully homomorphic quantum
computation. We refer to Page 15 for a more detailed description of how their
definitions relate to our framework. A more complete overview for these notions,
including semantic security for quantum encryption schemes, can be found in
another concurrent work [1].
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly recall the classical security notions for encryption
schemes secure against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA). In addition, we revisit
the two existing indistinguishability notions for the quantum world. We start by
introducing notation we will use throughout the paper.
We say that a function f : N → R is polynomially bounded iff there exists
a polynomial p and a value n¯ ∈ N such that: for every n ≥ n¯ we have that
f(n) ≤ p(n); in this case we will just write f = poly (n). We say that a function
ε : N → R is negligible, if and only if for every polynomial p, there exists an
np ∈ N such that ε(n) ≤ 1p(n) for every n ≥ np; in this case we will just write
ε = negl (n). In this work, we focus on secret-key encryption schemes. In all that
follows we use n ∈ N as the security parameter.
Definition 2.1 (Secret-Key Encryption Scheme [10]). A secret-key
encryption scheme is a triple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Gen,
Enc, Dec) operating on a message space M = {0, 1}m (where m = poly (n) ∈ N)
that fulfills the following two conditions:
1. The key generation algorithm Gen(1n) on input of security parameter n in
unary outputs a bitstring k.
2. For all k in the range of Gen(1n) and any message x ∈ M, the algorithms
Enc (encryption) and Dec (decryption) satisfy Pr[Dec(k,Enc(k, x)) = x] = 1,
where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of Enc and Dec.
We write K for the range of Gen(1n) (the key space) and Enck(x) for Enc(k, x).
2.1 Classical Security Notions: IND-CPA and SEM-CPA
We turn to security notions for encryption schemes. In this work, we will only
look at the notions of indistinguishability of ciphertexts under adaptively cho-
sen plaintext attack (IND-CPA), and semantic security under adaptively chosen
plaintext attack (SEM-CPA), which are known to be equivalent (e.g., [10]).
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Game-Based Definitions. In general these notions can be defined as a game
between a challenger C and an adversary A. First, C generates a legitimate key
running k ←− Gen(1n) which he uses throughout the game. The game starts
with a first learning phase. A challenge phase follows where A receives a chal-
lenge. Afterwards, a second learning phase follows, and finally A has to output a
solution. The learning phases define the type of attack, and the challenge phase
the notion captured by the game. We give all our definitions by referring to this
game framework and by defining a learning and a challenge phase.
The CPA Learning Phase: A is allowed to adaptively ask C for encryptions
of messages of his choice. C answers the queries using key k. Note that this is
equivalent to saying that A gets oracle access to an encryption oracle that was
initialized with key k.
The IND Challenge Phase: A defines a challenge template consisting of two
equal-length messages x0, x1, and sends it to C. The challenger C samples a
random bit b $←− {0, 1} uniformly at random, and replies with the encryption
Enck(xb). A’s goal is to guess b.
Definition 2.2 (IND-CPA). A secret-key encryption scheme is called IND-
CPA secure if the success probability of any probabilistic polynomial-time adver-
sary winning the game defined by CPA learning phases and an IND challenge
phase is at most negligibly (in n) close to 1/2.
The SEM Challenge Phase: A sends C a challenge template (Sm, hm, fm)
consisting of a poly-sized circuit Sm specifying a distribution over m-bit long
plaintexts, an advise function hm : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}∗, and a target function
fm : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}∗. The challenger C replies with the pair (Enck(x), hm(x))
where x is sampled according to Sm. A’s challenge is to output fm(x).
In the definition of semantic security it is not required that A’s probability
of winning the game is always negligible. Instead, A’s success probability is
compared to that of a simulator S that plays in a reduced game: On one hand,
S gets no learning phases. On the other hand, during the challenge phase, S does
not receive the ciphertext but only the output of the advice function. This use
of a simulator is what makes the notion hard to work with in proofs as one has
to construct a simulator for every possible A to prove a scheme secure.
Definition 2.3 (SEM-CPA). A secret-key encryption scheme is called SEM-
CPA secure if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A there exists
a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S such that the challenge templates
produced by S and A are identically distributed and the success probability of A
winning the game defined by CPA learning phases and a SEM challenge phase
(computed over the coins of A, Gen, and Sm) is negligibly close (in n) to the
success probability of S winning the reduced game.
Semantic security models what we want an encryption scheme to achieve:
An adversary given a ciphertext can learn nothing about the encrypted message
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which he could not also learn from his knowledge of the message distribution
and possibly existing side-information (modeled by hm). Indistinguishability of
ciphertexts is an equivalent technical notion introduced to simplify proofs.
2.2 Previous Notions of Security in the Quantum World
We briefly recall the results from [4] about quantum indistinguishability notions.
We refer to [20] for commonly used notation and quantum information-theoretic
concepts. Given security parameter n, let {Hn}n be a family of complex Hilbert
spaces such that dimHn = 2poly (n). We assume that Hn contains all the sub-
spaces where the message states, the ciphertext states and any auxiliary state
live. For the sake of simplicity we will not make a distinction when writing that
a state |ϕ〉 belongs to one particular subspace, and we will omit the index n
when the security parameter is implicit, therefore writing just |ϕ〉 ∈ H. We will
denote pure states with ket notation, e.g., |ϕ〉, while mixed states will be denoted
by lowercase Greek letters, e.g. ρ. We start by defining what we call a classical
description of a quantum state:
Definition 2.4 (Classical Description). A classical description of a quantum
state ρ is a (classical) bitstring describing a quantum circuit S which (takes no
input but starts from a fixed initial state |0〉 and) outputs ρ.
This definition will be used later in our new notions of security. We deviate
here from the traditional meaning of ‘classical description’ referring to individual
numerical entries of the density matrix. The reason is that our definition also
covers the cases where those numerical entries are not easily computable, as
long as we can give an explicit constructive procedure for that state. Clearly,
every pure quantum state |ϕ〉 has a classical description given by a description
of the quantum circuit which implements the unitary that maps |0〉 to |ϕ〉. The
classical description of a mixed state ρA is given by the circuit which first creates
a purification |ϕ〉AR of ρA and then only outputs the A register. Note that a state
admitting a classical description cannot be entangled with any other system.
For encryption, following the approach in [4] and many other works, we define
the following:
Definition 2.5 (Quantum Encryption Oracle [4]). Let Enc be the encryp-
tion algorithm of a secret-key encryption scheme E. We define the quantum
encryption oracle UEnck associated with E and initialized with key k as (a family
of) unitary operators defined by:
UEnck :
∑
x,y
αx,y |x〉 |y〉 →
∑
x,y
αx,y |x〉 |y ⊕ Enck(x)〉 (1)
where the same randomness r is used in superposition in all the executions of
Enck(x) within one query1 – for each new query, a fresh independent r is used.
1 As shown in [4], this is not restrictive.
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The first indistinguishability notion proposed in [4] replaces all classical com-
munication between A and C by quantum communication. A and C are now
quantum circuits operating on quantum states, and sharing a certain number of
qubits (the quantum communication register). The definition for the new secu-
rity game is obtained from Definition 2.2 by changing the learning and challenge
phases as follows:
Quantum CPA Learning Phase (qCPA): A gets oracle access to UEnck .
Fully Quantum IND Challenge Phase (fqIND): A prepares the com-
munication register in the state
∑
x0,x1,y
αx0,x1,y |x0〉 |x1〉 |y〉, consisting of two
m-qubit states (the two input-message superpositions) and an ancilla state to
store the ciphertext. C samples a bit b $←− {0, 1} and applies the transformation:
∑
x0,x1,y
αx0,x1,y |x0〉 |x1〉 |y〉 →
∑
x0,x1,y
αx0,x1,y |x0〉 |x1〉 |y ⊕ Enck(xb)〉 .
A’s goal is to output b.
The resulting security notion in [4] is called indistinguishability under fully
quantum chosen-message attacks (IND-fqCPA). We decided to rename it to fully
quantum indistinguishability under quantum chosen-message attacks (fqIND-
qCPA) in order to fit into our naming scheme: It consists of a quantum CPA
learning phase and a fully quantum IND challenge phase.
Definition 2.6 (fqIND-qCPA). A secret-key encryption scheme is said to
be fqIND-qCPA secure if the success probability of any quantum probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary winning the game defined by qCPA learning phases
and a fqIND challenge phase is at most negligibly close (in n) to 1/2.
As already observed in [4], this notion is unachievable. The separation by
Boneh and Zhandry exploits the entanglement of quantum states, namely the
fact that entanglement can be created between plaintext and ciphertext.
Theorem 2.7 (BZ Attack [4, Theorem 4.2]). No symmetric-key encryption
scheme can achieve fqIND-qCPA security.
Proof. The attack works as follows: The adversary A chooses as challenge mes-
sages the states |0m〉 and H |0m〉 (where H denotes the m-fold tensor Hadamard
transform), i.e. he prepares the register in the state
∑
x
1
2m/2
|0m, x, 0m〉. When
the challenger C performs the encryption, we can have two cases:
– if b = 0, i.e. the first message state is chosen, the state is transformed into
∑
x
1
2m/2
|0m, x,Enck(0m)〉 = |0m〉 ⊗ H |0m〉 ⊗ |Enck(0m)〉 ;
– if b = 1, i.e. the second message state is chosen, the state is transformed into
∑
x
1
2m/2
|0m, x,Enck(x)〉 = |0m〉 ⊗
∑
x
1
2m/2
|x,Enck(x)〉 .
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Notice that in the second case we have a fully entangled state between the second
and the third register. At this point, A does the following:
1. measures (traces out) the third register;
2. applies again H to the second register;
3. measures the second register;
4. outputs b′ = 1 iff the outcome of this last measurement is 0m, else outputs 0.
In fact, if b = 0, then the second register is left untouched: By applying again the
Hadamard transformation it will be reset to the state |0m〉, and a measurement
on this state will yield 0m with probability 1. If b = 1 instead, tracing out
one half of a fully entangled state results in a complete mixture in the second
register. Applying a Hadamard transform and measuring in the computational
basis necessarily gives a fully random outcome, and hence outcome 0m only with
probability 12m , which is negligible in n, because m = poly (n). unionsq
Theorem 2.7 implies that the fqIND-qCPA notion is too strong. In order to
weaken it, the following notion of indistinguishability under adaptively chosen
quantum plaintext attacks was introduced:
Definition 2.8 (IND-qCPA [4]). A secret-key encryption scheme is said to
be IND-qCPA secure if the success probability of any quantum probabilistic poly-
nomial-time adversary winning the game defined by qCPA learning phases and
a classical IND challenge phase is at most negligibly close (in n) to 1/2.
In this definition, the CPA queries are allowed to be quantum, but the chal-
lenge query is required to be classical. It has been shown that, under standard
computational assumptions, IND-qCPA is strictly stronger than IND-CPA:
Theorem 2.9 (IND-CPA ⇒ IND-qCPA [4, Theorem 4.8]). If classically
secure PRFs exist and order-finding in prime groups is classically hard, then
there exists an encryption scheme E which is IND-CPA secure, but not IND-
qCPA secure.
3 New Notions of Quantum Indistinguishability
IND-qCPA might be viewed as classical indistinguishability (IND) under a quan-
tum chosen plaintext attack (qCPA). The authors in [4] resorted to this defi-
nition in order to overcome their impossibility result on one seemingly natural
notion of quantum indistinguishability (fqIND-qCPA) which turned out to be
too strong. This raises the question whether IND-qCPA is the only possible
quantum indistinguishability notion (and hence no classical encryption scheme
can achieve indistinguishability of ciphertext superpositions) or if there exists a
stronger notion which can be achieved.
In this section we show that by defining fqIND-qCPA, there are many choices
which are made implicitly, and that on the other hand there exist other possible
quantum indistinguishability notions. We discuss these choices spanning a binary
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‘security tree’ of possible notions. Afterwards, we obtain a small set of candidate
notions, eliminating those that are either ill-posed or unachievable because of
the BZ attack from Theorem 2.7. In all these notions, we implicitly assume
‘quantum CPA learning phases’, as in the case of IND-qCPA. However, we limit
the discussion in this section to the design of a quantum challenge phase. In the
end, we select a suitable ‘qIND-’notion amongst all the possible candidate ones.
3.1 The ‘Security Tree’
To define a general notion of indistinguishability in the quantum world, we have
to consider many different distinctions for possible candidate models. For exam-
ple, can we rule out certain forms of entanglement? How? Does the adversary
have complete control over the challenger device? Each of these distinctions
leads to a fork in a ‘security-model binary tree’. We analyze every ‘leaf’ of the
tree2. Some of them lead to unreasonable or ill-posed models, some of them yield
unachievable security notions, and others are analyzed in more detail.
Game Model: Oracle (O) vs. Challenger (C). This distinction decides how
the game, and especially the challenge phase, is implemented. In the classical
world, the following two cases are equivalent but in the quantum world they
differ. In the oracle model, the adversary A gets oracle access to encryption and
challenge oracles, i.e., he plays the game by performing calls to unitary gates
O1, . . . ,Oq. In this case A is modeled as a quantum circuit which implements a
sequence of unitary gates U0, . . . , Uq, intertwined by calls to the Oi’s. Given an
input state |ϕ〉, the adversary therefore computes the state:
UqOq . . . U1O1U0 |ϕ〉 .
The structure of the oracle gates Oi itself is unknown to A, who is only
allowed to apply them in a black-box way. The fqIND notion uses this model.
In what we call the challenger model instead, the game is played against
an external (quantum) challenger. Here, A is a quantum circuit which shares a
quantum register (the communication channel) with another quantum circuit C.
The main difference is that in this case we can also consider what happens if
C has additional input or output lines out of A’s control. Moreover, A does
not automatically gain access to the inverse (adjoint) of quantum operations
performed by C, and C cannot be ‘rewound’ by the adversary, which would be
far too powerful possibilities. This scenario also covers the case of ‘unidirectional’
state transmission, i.e., when qubits are sent over a quantum channel to another
party, and they are not available afterwards until that party sends them back.
Regardless, in security proofs in the (C) model, it is still allowed for an external
entity (e.g. a simulator, or a reduction) to rewind the joint circuit composed by
adversary and challenger together, if need be. However, we are not aware of any
known reduction involving rewinding in this form for encryption schemes in the
quantum world.
2 We do not rule out that some of them might eventually lead to the same model.
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In order to keep consistency with this choice of the model, when also con-
sidering qCPA queries, we implicitly assume the same access mode to the Enck
oracle as in the qIND game. That is, if we are in the (O) scenario, during the
qCPA phase A has quantum oracle access to Enck. In the (C) case, instead,
superposition access to Enck is provided to A by an external challenger.
At first glance, the (O) model intuitively represents the scenario where A
has almost complete control of some encryption device, whereas the (C) model is
more suited to a ‘network’ scenario where A wants to compromise the security
of some external target.
Plaintexts: Quantum States (Q) vs. Classical Description (c). In the (Q)
model, the two m-qubit plaintexts chosen by A for the challenge template can
be arbitrary (BQP-producible) quantum states and can be entangled with each
other and other states. In the (c) model, instead, A is only allowed to choose
classical descriptions of two m-qubit quantum states according to Definition 2.4,
thus being only allowed to send classical information to C: the challenger C will
read the states’ descriptions and will build one of the two states depending on
his challenge bit b.
In classical models, there is no difference between sending a description of a
message or the message itself. In the quantum world, there is a big difference
between these two cases, as the latter allows A to establish entanglement of
the message(s) with other registers. This is not possible when using classical
descriptions. It might intuitively appear that the (Q) model (considered for the
fqIND-qCPA notion) is more natural. However, the (c) scenario models the case
where A is well aware of the message that is encrypted, but the message is not
constructed by A himself. Giving A the ability to choose the challenge messages
for the IND game models the worst case that might happen: A knows that the
ciphertext he receives is the encryption of one out of the two messages that
he can distinguish best. This closely reflects the intuition behind the classical
IND notions: in that game, the adversary is allowed to send the two messages
not because in the real world he would be allowed to do so, but because we
want to achieve security even for the best possible choice of messages from the
adversary’s perspective. Hence, the (c) model is a valid alternative. Will further
discuss the difference between these two models later.
Relaying of Plaintext States: Yes (Y ) vs. No (n). If C is not relaying (n),
this means that the two plaintext states chosen by A will not be ‘sent back’ to
A (in other words: their registers will not be available anymore to A after the
challenge encryption). In circuit terms, this means that at the beginning of the
game, C will have (one or two) ancilla registers in his internal (private) memory.
During the encryption phase, C will swap these register(s) with the content of
the original plaintext register(s), hence transferring their original content outside
of A’s control.
If the challenger is relaying (Y ) instead, this means that the two plaintext
states will be left in the original register (or channel), and may be accessed by
A at any moment. This is the model considered for fqIND.
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Again, the (Y ) case is more fitting to those cases where A ‘implements locally’
the encryption device and has almost full control of it, whereas the (n) case is
more appropriate when the game is played against some external entity which is
not under A’s control. This is a rather natural assumption, for example, when
states are sent over some quantum channel and not returned. We stress that
this distinction in relaying is not trivial: it is not possible for A, in general, to
simulate relaying by keeping internal states entangled with the plaintexts. As an
example, consider the attack in Theorem 2.7: it is easy to see that this cannot
be performed without relaying.
Type of Unitary Transformation: (1) vs. (2). In quantum computing, the
‘canonical’ way of evaluating a function f(x) in superposition is by using an
auxiliary register:
∑
x,y
αx,y |x, y〉 →
∑
x,y
αx,y |x, y ⊕ f(x)〉 .
This way ensures that the resulting operator is invertible, even if f is not. We call
this type-(1) transformations: if Enck is an encryption mapping m-bit plaintexts
to -bit ciphertexts, the resulting operator in this case will act on m +  qubits
in the following way:
∑
x,y
αx,y |x, y〉 →
∑
x,y
αx,y |x, y ⊕ Enck(x)〉 ,
where the y’s are ancillary values. This approach is also used for fqIND.
In our case, though, we do not consider arbitrary functions, but encryptions,
which act as bijections on some bit-string spaces (assuming that the randomness
is treated as an input). Therefore, provided that the encryption does not change
the size of a message, the following transformation is also invertible:
∑
x
αx |x〉 →
∑
x
αx |Enck(x)〉 . (2)
For the more general case of arbitrary message expansion factors, we will consider
transformations of the form:
∑
x,y
αx,y |x, y〉 →
∑
x,y
αx,y |ϕx,y〉 ,
where the length of the ancilla register is |y|= |Enck(x)|− |x| and ϕx,0= Enck(x)
for every x – i.e., initializing the ancilla y register in the |0〉 state produces a
correct encryption, which is what we expect from an honest quantum executor.
One might ask what happens if the ancilla is not initialized to 0, and we leave the
general case of arbitrary ancillas manipulation as an interesting open problem,
but we stress the fact that this behavior is not considered in the case of honest
parties. We call these type-(2) transformations3.
3 These are called minimal quantum oracles in [14].
Semantic Security and Indistinguishability in the Quantum World 71
Notice that, in general, type-(1) and type-(2) transformations are very differ-
ent: having quantum oracle access to a type-(2) unitary U (2)Enc and its adjoint also
gives access to the related type-(2) decryption oracle U (2)Dec :
∑
x αx |Enck(x)〉 →∑
x αx |x〉. In fact, notice that (U (2)Enc)† = U (2)Dec, while the adjoint of a type-(1)
encryption operator, (U (1)Enc)
†, is generally not a type-(1) decryption operator. In
particular, type-(2) operators are ‘more powerful’ in the sense that knowledge of
the secret key is required in order to build any efficient quantum circuit imple-
menting them. However, we stress the fact that whenever access to a decryption
oracle is allowed, the two models are completely equivalent, because then we
can simulate a type-(2) operator by using ancilla qubits and ‘uncomputing’ the
resulting garbage lines (see Fig. 1) (as we will see, this will be the case for the
challenger in our qIND notion).
Fig. 1. Equivalence between type-(1) and type-(2) in the case of 1-qubit messages. Left:
building a type-(1) encryption oracle by using a type-(2) encryption oracle (and its
inverse) as a black-box. Right: building a type-(2) encryption oracle by using type-(1)
encryption and decryption oracles as black-boxes.
3.2 Analysis of the Models
By considering these 4 distinctions in the security tree we have 24 = 16 possi-
ble candidate models to analyze. We label each of these candidate models by
appending each one of the 4 labels of every tree branch in brackets. Clearly,
16 different definitions of quantum indistinguishability is too much, but luckily
most of these are unreasonable or unachievable. To start with, we can ignore the
following:
Leaves of the Form (Oc . . .). In the O scenario, the oracle is actually a
quantum gate inside A’s quantum circuitry. Therefore A has the capability of
querying the oracle on states which are possibly entangled with other registers
kept by A itself.
Leaves of the Form (OQn . . .). Again, the oracle is a gate which has no
internal memory to store and keep the plaintext states sent by A.
Leaves of the Form (. . . Y 2). Relaying is not taken into account in type-(2)
transformations. In these transformations, to some extent, one of the two plain-
text registers is always relayed (after having been ‘transformed’ into a cipher-
text). If the other plaintext was to be relayed as well, this would immediately
compromise indistinguishability (because one of the two states would be modified
and the other not, and both of them would be handed over to A).
72 T. Gagliardoni et al.
Excluding these options leaves us with 7 models, but it is easy to see that 3
of them are unachievable because of the attack from Theorem 2.7. This is the
case for (OQY 1) (which is exactly fqIND-qCPA), (CQY 1), and (CcY 1). Of the
remaining 4, notice that (CQn1) and (Ccn1) are equivalent to the IND-qCPA
notion from [4]. The reason is that from A’s perspective, a non-relaying C is
indistinguishable from a C tracing out (measuring) the plaintext register (other-
wise A and C could communicate faster than light). This measuring operation
would make the ciphertext collapse into a single (classical) ciphertext. And since
tracing out the challenge register and applying the type-(1) operator U (1)Enc com-
mute, one can consider (without loss of generality) the case that A himself first
measures the plaintext register, and then initiates a classical IND query with C,
therefore recovering a classical definition of IND challenge query4. Therefore,
using any of (CQn1) or (Ccn1) would lead to a weaker notion of quantum indis-
tinguishability. Since we are interested in achieving stronger notions, we will
hence consider the more challenging scenarios (CQn2) and (Ccn2).
This argument also leads to the following interesting observation. Ultimately,
whether a challenger (or encryption device) performs type-(1) or type-(2) oper-
ations depends on its architecture which we cannot say anything about - we will
focus on the (. . . 2) models in order to be on the ‘safe side’, as they lead to secu-
rity notions which are harder to achieve. In order to design a secure encryption
device, it is good advice to avoid the possibility that it can be accessed in type-
(2) mode. For such a device, it would be sufficient to provide IND-qCPA security,
which is weaker and therefore easier to achieve. Clearly, providing guidelines on
how to construct encryption devices resilient to type-(2) access lies outside the
scope of this work.
3.3 qIND
At this point we are left with only two candidate notions: (Ccn2) and (CQn2).
From now on we will denote them as ‘quantum indistinguishability of ciphertexts’
(qIND) and ‘general quantum indistinguishability of ciphertexts’ (gqIND) resp.,
and we summarize the resulting challenge phases as follows.
Quantum IND Challenge Phase (qIND): A chooses two quantum states
ρ0, ρ1 having efficient (poly-sized) classical descriptions, and sends to C a chal-
lenge template consisting of these two classical descriptions according to Defini-
tion 2.4. C samples a bit b and replies to A with the state obtained by applying
the type-(2) operator U (2)Enck as defined in (2) to ρb. A’s goal is to output b.
General Quantum IND Challenge Phase (gqIND): A chooses two quan-
tum states ρ0, ρ1, and sends them to C. C samples a bit b, discards (traces out)
4 However, we stress that this interpretation is not entirely correct. In fact, one might
consider composition scenarios where the IND query is just an intermediate step,
and the plaintext and ciphertext registers are reunited at some later step. In such
scenarios, not relaying would not be equivalent to measuring. We ignore such con-
siderations in this work, and leave the general case of composable security as an
interesting open question.
Semantic Security and Indistinguishability in the Quantum World 73
ρ1−b, and replies to A with the state obtained by applying the type-(2) operator
U
(2)
Enck
as defined in (2) to ρb. A’s goal is to output b.
Using these challenge phases and the notion of a qCPA learning phase, we
define qIND-qCPA and gqIND-qCPA as follows.
Definition 3.1 (qIND-qCPA). A secret-key encryption scheme is said to be
qIND-qCPA secure if the success probability of any quantum probabilistic poly-
nomial time adversary winning the game defined by qCPA learning phases and
the qIND challenge phase above is at most negligibly close (in n) to 1/2.
Definition 3.2 (gqIND-qCPA). A secret-key encryption scheme is said to
be gqIND-qCPA secure if the success probability of any quantum probabilistic
polynomial time adversary winning the game defined by qCPA learning phases
and the gqIND challenge phase above is at most negligibly close (in n) to 1/2.
Since we mainly consider type-(2) transformations from now on, we will over-
load notation and also use UEnck to denote the type-(2) encryption operator.
Theorem 3.3 (gqIND-qCPA ⇒ qIND-qCPA). Let E be a symmetric-key
encryption scheme. If E is gqIND-qCPA secure, then E is also qIND-qCPA
secure.
The reason is that quantum states admitting an efficient classical description
(used in qIND) are just a special case of arbitrary quantum plaintext states (used
in gqIND). Despite this implication, we will mainly focus on the qIND notion in
the following, and we will use the gqIND notion only as a comparison to other
existing notions. The main reason for this choice is that in the context of classical
encryption schemes resistant to superposition quantum access, we believe that
it is important to not lose focus of what the capabilities of a ‘reasonable’ adver-
sary should be. Namely, recall the following classical IND argument: allowing
the adversary to send plaintexts to the challenger is equivalent to the fact that
indistinguishability must hold even for the most favorable case from the adver-
sary’s perspective. Such an argument does not hold anymore quantumly. In fact,
the (Q) model considered in gqIND presents the following issues:
– it allows entanglement between the adversary and the challenger: A could
prepare a state of the form ρAB = 1√2 |00〉+ 1√2 |11〉, sending ρA as a plaintext
but keeping ρB ;
– it allows the adversary to create certain non-reproduceable states. For exam-
ple, consider the state |ψ〉 = ∑x∈X 1√|X| |x, h(x)〉, where h is a collision-
resistant hash function. A could measure the second register, obtaining a
random outcome y, and knowing therefore that the remaining state is the
superposition of the preimages of y, |ψy〉 =
∑
x∈X:h(x)=y
1√
|{ x∈X:h(x)=y }| |x〉.
A could then use |ψy〉 as a plaintext in the challenge phase, but note that A
cannot reproduce |ψy〉 for a given value y.
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Both of the above examples are not reasonable in our scenario. Entanglement
between A and C represents a sort of ‘quantum watermarking’ of messages, which
goes beyond what a meaningful notion of indistinguishability should achieve.
Knowledge of intermediate, unpredictable measurements also renders A too pow-
erful, because it gives A access to information not available to C itself - e.g., in
the example above C would not even know the value of y. As it is C who prepares
the state to be encrypted, it is reasonable to assume that it is C who should know
these intermediate measurements, not A. In the example above, what A could
see instead (provided he knows the circuit generating the state, as we assume in
qIND) is that the plaintext is a mixture Ψ =
∑
y ψy for all possible values of y.
The possibility offered by gqIND of allowing the adversary to play the IND
game with arbitrary states is certainly elegant from a theoretical point of view,
but from the perspective of the quantum security of the kind of schemes we
are considering, it is too broad in scope. The (c) model used in qIND, on the
other hand, inherently provides guidelines and reasonable limitations on what a
quantum adversary can or cannot do. Also, qIND is often easier to deal with:
notice that in the (c) model, unlike in the (Q) model, A always receives back an
unentangled state from a challenge query. In security reductions, this means that
we can more easily simulate the challenger, and that we do not have to take care
of measures of entanglement when analyzing the properties of quantum states -
for example, indistinguishability of states can be shown by only resorting to the
trace norm instead of the more general diamond norm.
Furthermore, it is important to notice that all our new results in Sect. 6 are
unaffected by the choice of either qIND or gqIND. Our impossibility result from
Theorem 6.3 holds for qIND, and hence also for gqIND because of Theorem 3.3.
On the other hand, the security proof of Construction 6.6 (Theorem 6.9) is
given for gqIND, and holds therefore also for qIND. In fact, it remains unclear
whether a separation between qIND and gqIND can be found at all in the realm
of classical encryption schemes. We leave this as an interesting open question.
Finally, we note that the q-IND-CPA-2 indistinguishability notion for secret-
key encryption of quantum messages introduced by Broadbent and Jeffery
[6, Appendix B] resembles our gqIND notion, and it is in fact equivalent to it in
the case that the encryption operation is a symmetric-key classical functionality
operating in type-(2) mode.
Theorem 3.4 (gqIND-qCPA ⇔ q-IND-CPA-2). Let E be a symmetric-key
encryption scheme. Then E is gqIND-qCPA secure if and only if E is q-IND-
CPA-2 secure.
A proof of the above theorem can be found in the full version [9]. A general-
ization of q-IND-CPA-2 to arbitrary quantum encryption schemes, together with
equivalent notions of quantum semantic security, was given and analyzed in [1].
All these security notions are given in the context of ‘fully quantum encryption’,
in the sense that the encryption schemes considered in [6] and [1] are arbitrary
quantum circuits acting natively on quantum data, while in this work we con-
sider the quantum security of classical encryption schemes. The fully quantum
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homomorphic schemes which are shown to be secure in [6], and the other quan-
tum encryption schemes shown to be secure in [1], do not fall into the category
of classical encryption schemes which we are studying here. On the other hand,
as Theorem 6.9 shows, our Construction 6.6 is the first known example of a clas-
sical symmetric-key encryption scheme which is secure even against these kinds
of ‘fully quantum’ security notions.
4 New Notions of Quantum Semantic Security
In this section, we initiate the study of suitable definitions of semantic security
in the quantum world. As in the classical case, we are particularly interested in
notions that can be proven equivalent to some version of quantum indistinguisha-
bility. So these definitions actually describe the semantics of the equivalent IND
notions. As in the classical case, we present these notions in the non-uniform
model of computation.
Working towards a quantum SEM notion, we restrict our analysis to the SEM
challenge phase. For the learning phase, we stick to the ‘qCPA learning phase’, as
in Definition 2.5, where the adversary has access to a quantum encryption oracle.
In the end, we give a definition for quantum semantic security under quantum
chosen-plaintext attacks (qSEM-qCPA) which we later prove equivalent to qIND-
qCPA, thereby adding semantics to our qIND-qCPA notion.
4.1 Classical Semantic Security Under Quantum CPA
As a first notion of semantic security in the quantum world, we consider what
happens if, like in the IND-qCPA notion, we stick to the classical definition
but we allow for a quantum chosen-plaintext-attack phase. The definition uses
a SEM-qCPA game that is obtained by combining qCPA learning phases with a
classical SEM challenge phase as defined in Sect. 2. As in the classical case, A’s
success probability is compared to that of a simulator S that plays in a reduced
game: S gets no learning phase and during the challenge phase it only receives
the advice hm(x), not the ciphertext.
Definition 4.1 (SEM-qCPA). A secret-key encryption scheme is called SEM-
qCPA-secure if for every quantum polynomial-time machine A, there exists a
quantum polynomial-time machine S such that the challenge templates produced
by S and A are identically distributed and the success probability of A winning the
game defined by qCPA learning phases and a SEM challenge phase is negligibly
close (in n) to the success probability of S winning the reduced game.
Spoiler. It is easy to see that the SEM-qCPA notion of semantic security is
equivalent to IND-qCPA, see Theorem 5.1.
In the full version [9] we discuss what happens if one also allows quantum
advice states in this scenario, and why this option would not add anything
meaningful.
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4.2 Quantum Semantic Security
We now define quantum semantic security under chosen-plaintext attacks (qSEM-
qCPA). As in the classical case, we want the definition of semantic security to
formally capture what we intuitively understand as a strong security notion.
In the quantum case, there are several choices to be made. We start by giv-
ing our formal definition of quantum semantic security, and justify our choices
afterwards.
Quantum SEM (qSEM) Challenge Phase: A sends to C a challenge tem-
plate consisting of classical descriptions of
– a quantum circuit Gm taking poly (n)-bit classical input and outputting
m-qubit plaintext states,
– a quantum circuit hm taking m-qubit plaintexts as input and outputting
poly (n)-qubit advice states,
– a quantum circuit fm taking m-qubit plaintexts as input and outputting
poly (n)-qubit target states.
The challenger C samples y $←− {0, 1}poly (n) and computes two copies of the
plaintext ρy = Gm(y). One is used to compute auxiliary information hm(ρy)
and one to compute the ciphertext UEnck ρy U
†
Enck
. C then replies with the pair
(
UEnck ρy U
†
Enck
, hm(ρy)
)
. A’s goal is to output fm(ρy). We say that A wins the
qSEM-qCPA game if no quantum polynomial-time distinguisher can distinguish
A’s output from the target state fm(ρy) with non-negligible advantage.
In the reduced game, S receives no encryption, but only the auxiliary infor-
mation hm(ρy) from C. Analogously to the above case, Swins the qSEM-qCPA
game if no quantum polynomial-time distinguisher can distinguish S’s output
from the target state fm(ρy) with non-negligible advantage.
Definition 4.2 (qSEM-qCPA). A secret-key encryption scheme is called
qSEM-qCPA-secure if for every quantum polynomial-time machine A, there
exists a quantum polynomial-time machine S such that the challenge templates
produced by S and A are identically distributed and the success probability of A
winning the game defined by qCPA learning phases and a qSEM challenge phase
is negligibly close (in n) to the success probability of S winning the reduced game.
When defining quantum semantic security, we have to deal with several issues:
First, we have to define how the plaintext distribution is described. In the classi-
cal definition, the distribution is produced by a (classical) circuit Gm running on
uniform input bits. We take the same approach here, but let Gm output m-qubit
plaintexts.
The second question is how to define the advice function. While the input
should be the plaintext quantum state ρy, the output could be either quantum
or classical. We decided to allow quantum advice as it leads to a more general
model and it includes classical outputs as a special case. In order for the chal-
lenger to compute both the encryption of the plaintext state ρy and the advice
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state hm(ρy) without violation of the no-cloning theorem, we exploit how we gen-
erate the message state.We simply run Sm twice on the same classical randomness
y to generate two copies of the plaintext state ρy. Another option would have been
to allow for entanglement between the plaintext message ρy and the advice state
hm(ρy). Allowing such entanglement would model side-channel information the
attacker could obtain, for instance by learning the content of some internal regis-
ter of the attacked device. However, the resulting notion would not be equivalent
with qIND-qCPA anymore, because in qIND-qCPA, the challenge plaintexts are
provided by their classical descriptions and can therefore not be entangled with
the attacker.
Third, we have chosen to model the target function fm in the same way as
the advice function hm, i.e. we allow arbitrary quantum circuits that might out-
put quantum states. The reasoning behind allowing quantum output is again to
use the strongest possible, most general model. Allowing quantum output how-
ever leads to the problem that, in general, we cannot physically test anymore
if an adversary A outputs exactly the result of the target function fm(ρy). One
option would be to require A’s output to be close to fm(ρy) in terms of their
trace distance. But two quantum states can be quantum-polynomial-time indis-
tinguishable even if their trace distance is large5. Since we are only interested in
computational security notions, we solve this problem by requiring QPT indis-
tinguishability as success condition for winning the SEM game.
Spoiler. Our qSEM-qCPA notion of semantic security is equivalent to qIND-
qCPA, and unachievable for those schemes which leave the size of the message
unchanged (like most block ciphers), see Sect. 6.1.
5 Relations
In this section we show relations between our new notions of indistinguishability
and semantic security in the quantum world. It is already known [10,11] that
classically, IND-CPA and semantic security are equivalent. Our goal is to show
a similar equivalence for our new notions, plus to show a hierarchy of equivalent
security notions. Our results are summarized in Fig. 2.
Theorem 5.1 (IND-qCPA ⇔ SEM-qCPA). Let E be a symmetric-key
encryption scheme. Then E is IND-qCPA secure if and only if E is SEM-qCPA
secure.
We split the proof of Theorem 5.1 into two propositions – one per direction.
They closely follow the proofs for the classical case (see [10, Proof of Th. 5.4.11]),
we recall them as they work as guidelines for the following proofs.
5 Think of two different classical ciphertexts which are encrypted using a quantum-
computationally secure encryption scheme. Then, the ciphertext states are orthog-
onal (and hence their trace distance is maximal), but they are computationally
indistinguishable.
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Fig. 2. The relations between notions of indistinguishability and semantic security in
the quantum world (previously known results in gray).
Proposition 5.2 (IND-qCPA ⇒ SEM-qCPA).
Proposition 5.3 (SEM-qCPA ⇒ IND-qCPA).
Proof (of Proposition 5.2 – Sketch). The idea of the proof is to hand A’s circuit
as non-uniform advice to the simulator S. S runs A’s circuit and impersonates
the challenger C by generating a new key and answering all of A’s queries using
this key. When it comes to the challenge query, S encrypts the 1 . . . 1 string of
the same length as the original message. It follows from the indistinguishability
of encryptions that the adversary’s success probability in this game must be
negligibly close to its success probability in the real semantic-security game,
which concludes the proof. The only difference in the -qCPA case is that A and
S are quantum circuits, and that S has to emulate the quantum encryption
oracle instead of a classical one. unionsq
Proof (of Proposition 5.3).We recall here the full proof as it is short. Assume there
exists an efficient distinguisher A against the IND-qCPA security of E . Then we
show how to construct an oracle machine MA that has access to A and breaks the
SEM-qCPA security of the scheme. MA runs A, emulating the quantum encryp-
tion oracle by simply forwarding all the qCPA queries to its own oracle. As A
executes an IND challenge query on m-bit messages (x0, x1),MA produces the
SEM template (Gm, hm, fm) with Gm describing the uniform distribution over
{x0, x1 } , hm = 1n (or any other function such that hm(x0) = hm(x1)), and fm
a function that fulfills fm(x0) = 0 and fm(x1) = 1 (i.e., the distinguishing func-
tion). Then MA performs a SEM challenge query with this template, and given
challenge ciphertext c, uses it to answer A’s query. If, at that point, A performs
more qCPA queries, MA answers again by forwarding all these queries to its own
oracle. Finally, MA outputs A’s output. As A distinguishes encryptions of x0 and
x1 with non-negligible success probability, A will return the correct value of fm
with recognizably higher probability than guessing. As hm is independent of the
encrypted message, no simulator can do better than guessing. Hence, MA has a
non-negligible advantage to output the right value of fm. unionsq
Theorem 5.4 (qIND-qCPA ⇔ qSEM-qCPA). Let E be a symmetric-key
encryption scheme. Then E is qIND-qCPA secure if and only if E is qSEM-qCPA
secure.
Again, we split the proof of Theorem 5.4 into two propositions.
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Proposition 5.5 (qIND-qCPA ⇒ qSEM-qCPA).
Proposition 5.6 (qSEM-qCPA ⇒ qIND-qCPA).
Proof (of Proposition 5.5 – Sketch). The proof follows that of Proposition 5.2,
with some careful observations. Since A is a QPT adversary against the qSEM-
qCPA game, A’s circuit has a short classical representation ξ. So S gets ξ as non-
uniform advice and hence can implement and run A. The simulator S simulates
C for A by generating a new key and answering all of A’s qCPA queries. When
it comes to the challenge query, A produces a qSEM template, which S forwards
to the real C. Then S forwards C’s reply, plus a bogus encrypted state (e.g.,
UEnck |1 . . . 1〉), to A. If at this point A outputs a state ϕ which can be efficiently
distinguished from the correct fm(ρy) computed by the real C, we would have
an efficient distinguisher against the qIND-qCPA security of the scheme. Hence,
A’s (and therefore also S’s) output must be indistinguishable from fm(ρy) for
any QPT distinguisher, which concludes the proof. unionsq
Proof (of Proposition 5.6). This is also similar to the proof of Proposition 5.3.
Given an efficient distinguisher A for the qIND-qCPA game, our adversary for
the qSEM-qCPA game is an oracle machine MA running A and acting as fol-
lows. Concerning A’s qCPA queries, as usual MA just forwards everything to the
qSEM-qCPA challenger C. When A performs a challenge qIND query by send-
ing the classical descriptions of two states ϕ0 and ϕ1, MA prepares the qSEM
template (Gm, hm, fm), with Gm outputing ϕ0 for half of the possible y values
and ϕ1 for the other half, hm(ρy) = 1n, and fm the identity map fm(ρy) = ρy.
Then MA performs a qSEM challenge query with this template. Given challenge
ciphertext state UEnck ϕb U
†
Enck
(for b ∈ {0, 1}), he forwards it as an answer to
A’s challenge query. As A distinguishes UEnck ϕ0 U†Enck from UEnck ϕ1 U
†
Enck
with
non-negligible success probability, A returns the correct value of b with non-
negligible advantage over guessing. Then MA, having recorded a copy of the
classical descriptions of ϕ0 and ϕ1, is able to compute the state fm(ϕb) exactly,
and consequently win the qSEM-qCPA game with non-negligible advantage. As
hm generates the same advice state hm(ρy) = 1n independently of the encrypted
message, no simulator can do better than guessing the plaintext. This concludes
the proof. unionsq
Finally, we show the separation result between the two classes of security we
have identified (we show it between IND-qCPA and qIND-qCPA). This shows
that qIND-qCPA (and equivalently qSEM-qCPA) is a strictly stronger notion
than IND-qCPA (which is equivalent to SEM-qCPA).
Theorem 5.7 (IND-qCPA  qIND-qCPA). There exists a symmetric-key
encryption scheme E which is IND-qCPA secure but not qIND-qCPA secure.
Proof (of Theorem 5.7). The scheme we use as a counterexample is the one from
[10] (Construction 5.3.9). It has been proven in [4] that this scheme is IND-qCPA
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secure if the used PRF is post-quantum secure. We exhibit a distinguisher A
which breaks the qIND-qCPA security of this scheme with high probability. For
ease of notation we restrict to the case of single-bit messages 0 and 1. A will
simply choose as challenge states: |ϕ0〉 = H |0〉 = 1√2 |0〉 + 1√2 |1〉, and |ϕ1〉 =
H |1〉 = 1√
2
|0〉− 1√
2
|1〉. When the challenger C applies the type-2 transformation
to either of these two states, it is easy to see that in any case the state is left
unchanged. This is because UEnck just applies a permutation in the space of
the basis elements, but |ϕ0〉 and |ϕ1〉 have the same amplitudes on all their
components, except for the sign. As these two states are orthogonal, they can
be reliably distinguished by the adversary A who can then win the qIND-qCPA
game with probability 1. unionsq
The above proof can be generalized to message states of arbitrary length, as
our impossibility result in Sect. 6.1 shows.
6 Impossibility and Achievability Results
In this section we show that qIND-qCPA (and equivalently qSEM-qCPA) is
impossible to achieve for encryption schemes which do not expand the mes-
sage (such as stream ciphers and many block ciphers, without considering the
randomness part in the ciphertext). Therefore, for a scheme to be secure accord-
ing to this new definition, it is necessary (but not sufficient) to increase the
message size during the encryption. Interestingly, such an increase happens in
most public-key post-quantum encryption schemes, like for example LWE based
schemes [18] or the McEliece scheme [19].
Then we propose a construction of a qIND-qCPA–secure symmetric-key
encryption scheme. Our construction works for any (quantum-secure) pseudo-
random permutation (PRP). Given that block ciphers are usually modelled as
PRPs, it seems reasonable to assume that we can obtain a secure scheme when
using block ciphers with sufficiently large key and block size. Hence, our con-
struction can be used to patch existing schemes, or as a guideline in the design
of quantum-secure encryption schemes from block ciphers.
6.1 Impossibility Result
First we formally define what it means for a cipher to expand or keep con-
stant the message size by defining the core function of a (secret-key) encryption
scheme. Intuitively, the definition splits the ciphertext into the randomness and
a part carrying the message-dependent information. This definition covers most
encryption schemes in the literature.
Definition 6.1 (Core Function). Let (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a secret-key encryp-
tion scheme. We call the function f : K ×{0, 1}τ ×M → Y the core function of
the encryption scheme if, for some τ ∈ N:
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– for all k ∈ K and x ∈ M, Enck(x) can be written as (r, f(k, r, x)), where
r ∈ {0, 1}τ is independent of the message; and
– there exists a function f ′ such that for all k ∈ K, r ∈ {0, 1}τ , x ∈ M, we have:
f ′(k, r, f(k, x, r)) = x.
For example, in case of Construction 5.3.9 from [10] (where Enck(x) is defined
as (r, Fk(r) ⊕ x) for a PRF F ) the core function is f(k, r, x) = Fk(r) ⊕ x, with
f ′(k, r, z) = z ⊕ Fk(r).
Definition 6.2 (Quasi–Length-Preserving Encryption). We call a secret-
key encryption scheme with core function f quasi–length-preserving if
∀x ∈ M, r ∈ {0, 1}τ , k ∈ K ⇒ |f(k, x, r)| = |x|,
i.e., if the output of the core function has the same bit length as the message.
Continuing the above example, Construction 5.3.9 from [10] is quasi–length-
preserving.
The crucial observation is the following: For a quasi–length-preserving
encryption scheme, the space of possible input and (core function) output bit-
strings (with respect to plaintext and ciphertext) coincide, therefore these ciphers
act as permutations on this space. This means that if we start with an input
state which is a superposition of all the possible basis states, all of them with the
same amplitude, this state will be unchanged by the unitary type-2 encryption
operation (because it will just ‘shuffle’ in the basis-state space amplitudes which
are exactly the same).
Theorem 6.3 (Impossibility Result). No quasi–length-preserving secret-key
encryption scheme can be qIND secure.
Proof. Let (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a quasi–length-preserving scheme. We show an
attack that is a generalization of the distinguishing attack in Theorem 5.7.
1. for m-bit message strings, the distinguisher D sets the two plaintext states
for the qIND- game to be: |ϕ0〉 = H |0m〉 , |ϕ1〉 = H |1m〉, where H is the
m-fold tensor Hadamard transformation. Notice that both these states admit
efficient classical representations, and are thus allowed in the qIND game.
2. The challenger flips a random bit b and returns |ψ〉 = UEnck |ϕb〉.
3. D applies H to the core-function part of the ciphertext |ψ〉 and measures it
in the computational basis. D outputs 0 if and only if the outcome is 0m, and
outputs 1 otherwise.
As already observed, applying UEnck to H |0m〉 leaves the state untouched:
since the encryption oracle merely performs a permutation in the basis space, and
since |ϕ0〉 is a superposition of every basis element with the same amplitude, it
follows that whenever b is equal to 0, the ciphertext state will be unchanged. In
this case, after applying the self-inverse transformation H again, D obtains mea-
surement outcome 0m with probability 1. On the other hand, if b = 1, |ϕ1〉 =
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1
2m/2
∑
y(−1)y·1
m |y〉 where a · b denotes the bitwise inner product between a and
b. Hence, |ϕ1〉 is a superposition of every basis element where (depending on the
parity of y) half of the elements have a positive amplitude and the other half have a
negative one, but all of themwill be equal in absolute value. ApplyingUEnc,k to this
state, results in 1
2m/2
∑
y(−1)y·1
m |Enck(y)〉. After re-applying H, the amplitude
of the basis state |0m〉 becomes ∑y(−1)y·1
m+Enck(y)·0m which is easily calculated
to be 0. Hence, the above attack gives D a way of perfectly distinguishing between
encryptions of the two plaintext states. unionsq
Notice that the above attack also works if A is allowed to send quantum
states to C directly. Therefore, it also holds for the gqIND notion of quantum
indistinguishability described in Sect. 3. In particular, the above theorem shows
that [10, Construction 5.3.9], which in [4] was shown to be IND-qCPA if the
used PRF is quantum secure, does not fulfill qIND, nor gqIND.
This attack is a consequence of the well-known fact that, in order to perfectly
(information-theoretically) encrypt a single quantum bit, two bits of classical
information are needed: one to hide the basis bit, and one to hide the phase (i.e.
the signs of the amplitudes). The fact that we are restricted to quantum opera-
tions of the form UEnck - that is, quantum instantiations of classical encryptions -
means that we cannot afford to hide the phase as well, and this restriction allows
for an easy distinguishing procedure.
6.2 Secure Construction
Here we propose a construction of a qIND-qCPA secure symmetric-key encryp-
tion scheme from any family of quantum-secure pseudorandom permutations
(see the full version [9] for formal definitions).
Construction 6.4. For security parameter n, let m = poly (n) and τ =
poly (n). Consider an efficient family of permutations Πm+τ = (I,Π,Π−1) with
key space KΠ that operates on bit strings of length m+ τ , and consider a plain-
text message space M = {0, 1}m, key space K = KΠ , and ciphertext space
C = {0, 1}m+τ . The construction is given by the following algorithms:
Key generation algorithm k ←− Gen(1n): on input of security parameter n,
the key generation algorithm runs k ←− I(1m+τ ) and returns secret key k.
Encryption algorithm y ←− Enck(x): on input of message x ∈ M and key
k ∈ K, the encryption algorithm samples a τ -bit string r $←− {0, 1}τ uniformly
at random, and outputs y = πk(x‖r) (‖ denotes string concatenation).
Decryption algorithm x ←− Deck(y): on input of ciphertext y ∈ C and key
k ∈ K, the decryption algorithm first runs x′ = π−1k (y), and then returns the
first m bits of x′.
The soundness of the construction can be easily checked. The security is
stated in the following theorem.
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Theorem 6.5 (qIND-qCPA Security of Construction 6.4). If Πm+τ is a
family of quantum-secure pseudorandom permutations (qPRP), then the encryp-
tion scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) defined in Construction 6.4 is qIND-qCPA secure.
In the next section, we prove the security of a more powerful scheme which
includes the above theorem as special case of a single message block.
6.3 Length Extension
Construction 6.4 has the drawback that the message length is upper bounded
by the input length of the qPRP (minus the bit length of the randomness).
However, like in the case of block ciphers, we can overcome this issue with a
mode of operation. More specifically, we can handle arbitrary message lengths
by splitting the message into m-bit blocks and applying the encryption algorithm
of Construction 6.4 independently to each message block (using the same key
but new randomness for each block). This procedure is akin to a ‘randomized
ECB mode’, in the sense that each message block is processed separately, like in
the ECB (Electronic Code Book) mode, but in our case the underlying cipher
is inherently randomized (since we use fresh randomness for each block), so we
can still achieve qCPA security. For simplicity we consider only message lengths
which are multiples of m. The construction can be generalized to arbitrary mes-
sage lengths using standard padding techniques. Moreover, the randomness for
every block can be generated efficiently using a random seed and a post-quantum
secure PRNG.
Construction 6.6. For security parameter n, let m = poly (n) and τ =
poly (n). Consider an efficient family of permutations Πm+τ = (I,Π,Π−1) with
key space KΠ that operates on bit strings of length m+ τ , and consider a plain-
text message space M = {0, 1}μm for μ ∈ N, μ = poly (n), key space K = KΠ ,
and ciphertext space C = {0, 1}μ(m+τ). The construction is given by the following
algorithms:
Key generation algorithm k ←− Gen(1n): on input of security parameter n,
the key generation algorithm runs k ←− I(1m+τ ) and returns secret key k.
Encryption algorithm y ←− Enck(x): on input of message x ∈ M and key
k ∈ K, the encryption algorithm splits x into μ m-bit blocks x1, . . . , xμ. For
each block xi, the encryption algorithm samples a new τ -bit string ri
$←−
{0, 1}τ uniformly at random, and outputs yi = πk(xi‖ri) (‖ denotes string
concatenation). The ciphertext is y = y1‖ . . . ‖yμ.
Decryption algorithm x ←− Deck(y): on input of ciphertext y ∈ C and key
k ∈ K, the decryption algorithm first splits y into μ m+τ -bit blocks y1, . . . , yμ.
Then, it runs x′i = (π
−1
k (yi))m for each block (where (s)m refers to taking the
first m bits of bit string s). It returns the plaintext x′ = x′1, . . . , x
′
μ.
The soundness of the construction can be checked easily. For the security, we
observe that splitting a μm-qubit plaintext state into μ blocks of m-qubits can
introduce entanglement between the blocks. We will address this issue through
the following technical lemma.
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Lemma 6.7. Let E be the quantum channel that takes as input an arbitrary m-
qubit state, attaches another τ qubits in state |0〉, and then applies a permutation
picked uniformly at random from S2m+τ to the computational basis space. Let T
be the constant channel which maps any m-qubit state to the totally mixed state
on m + τ qubits. Then, ‖E − T ‖ ≤ 2−τ+2.
Proof. In order to consider the fact that the m-qubit input state might be entan-
gled with something else, we have to start with a purification of such a state.
Formally, this is a bipartite pure 2m-qubit state |φ〉XY =
∑
x,y αx,y |x〉X |y〉Y
whose m-qubit Y register is input into the channel and gets transformed into
idX ⊗ E(|φ〉〈φ|) = trΠ |ψ〉〈ψ| where
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈{0,1}m,y∈{0,1}m,π∈S2m+τ
αx,y |x〉X |π(y||0)〉C |π〉Π .
By definition of the diamond-norm, we have to show that for any 2m-qubit state
ρ, we have that ‖(id ⊗ E)(ρ) − (id ⊗ T )(ρ)‖tr ≤ 2−τ+2. Due to the convexity
of the trace distance, we may assume that ρ = |φ〉〈φ| is pure with |φ〉XY =∑
x,y αx,y |x〉X |y〉Y . Hence, we obtain
(idX ⊗ E)(|φ〉〈φ|) = trΠ |ψ〉〈ψ|
=
1
2m+τ !
∑
x,x′,y,y′,π
αx,yαx′,y′ |x〉〈x′|X ⊗ |π(y‖0)〉 〈π(y′‖0)|C
=
1
2m+τ !
∑
x,x′,y
αx,yαx′,y|x〉〈x′|X ⊗
∑
π
|π(y‖0)〉 〈π(y‖0)|C
+
1
2m+τ !
∑
x,x′,y =y′
αx,yαx′,y′ |x〉〈x′|X ⊗
∑
π
|π(y‖0)〉 〈π(y′‖0)|C
=
∑
x,x′,y
αx,yαx′,y|x〉〈x′|X ⊗
1
2m+τ
∑
z
|z〉〈z|C
+
∑
x,x′,y =y′
αx,yαx′,y′ |x〉〈x′|X ⊗
1
2m+τ (2m+τ − 1)
∑
z =z′
|z〉〈z′|C
= trY |φ〉〈φ| ⊗ τC + χXC
= (idX ⊗ T )(|φ〉〈φ|) + χXC ,
where we defined the “difference state”
χXC :=
∑
x,x′,y =y′
αx,yαx′,y′ |x〉〈x′|X ⊗
1
2m+τ (2m+τ − 1)
∑
z =z′
|z〉〈z′|C .
In order to conclude, it remains to show that ‖χXC‖tr ≤ 2−τ+2. For the
C-register χC = 12m+τ (2m+τ −1)
∑
z =z′ |z〉〈z′|C , one can verify that the 2m+τ
eigenvalues are (c · (2m+τ − 1),−c,−c, . . . ,−c) where c := 12m+τ (2m+τ −1) . Hence,
the trace norm (which is the sum of the absolute eigenvalues) is exactly
c · 2(2m+τ − 1) = 2−m−τ+1.
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For the X-register, we split χX into two parts χX = ξX − ξ′X where
ξX :=
∑
x,x′
|x〉〈x′|
∑
y,y′
αx,yαx′,y′ ,
ξ′X :=
∑
x,x′
|x〉〈x′|
∑
y
αx,yαx′,y,
and use the triangle inequality for the trace norm ‖χX‖tr = ‖ξX − ξ′X‖tr ≤
‖ξX‖tr + ‖ξ′X‖tr. Observe that ‖ξX‖tr = ‖
∑
x,y αx,y |x〉
∑
x′,y′ αx′,y′ 〈x′| ‖tr =
‖|s〉〈s|‖tr for the (non-normalized) vector |s〉 :=
∑
x,y αx,y |x〉. Hence, the trace-
norm ‖ξX‖tr = | 〈s | s〉 | =
∑
x |
∑
y αx,y|2 ≤
∑
x
∑
y |αx,y|2 · 2m = 2m by the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the normalization of the αx,y’s. Furthermore, we
note that ξ′X is exactly the reduced density matrix of |φ〉XY after tracing out
the Y register. Hence, ξ′X is positive semi-definite and its trace norm is equal to
its trace which is 1. In summary, we have shown that
‖χXC‖tr = ‖χX‖tr · ‖χC‖tr ≤ (‖ξX − ξ′X‖tr) · 2−m−τ+1
≤ (‖ξX‖tr + ‖ξ′X‖tr) · 2−m−τ+1 ≤ (2m + 1) · 2−m−τ+1 ≤ 2−τ+2.
unionsq
If we consider a slightly different encryption channel ET which still maps m
qubits to m + τ qubits but where the permutation π is not picked uniformly
from S2m+τ , but instead we are guaranteed that a certain set T ⊂ {0, 1}m+τ
of outputs never occurs, we can consider such permutations w.l.o.g. as picked
uniformly at random from a smaller set S2m+τ −|T |. In this setting, we are inter-
ested in the distance of the encryption operation ET from the slightly different
constant channel T T which maps all inputs to the (m + τ)-qubit state which is
completely mixed on the smaller set {0, 1}m+τ \ T . By modifying slightly the
proof of Lemma 6.7 we get the following.
Corollary 6.8. Let ET and T T be the channels defined above. Then,
‖ET − T T ‖ ≤ 42τ − |T |/2m . (3)
We can now prove the security of Construction 6.6. We give the proof for
gqIND-qCPA, and then qIND-qCPA follows immediately from Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 6.9 (gqIND-qCPA Security of Construction 6.6). If Πm+τ is a
family of quantum-secure pseudorandom permutations (qPRP), then the encryp-
tion scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) defined in Construction 6.6 is gqIND-qCPA secure.
Proof. We want to show that no QPT distinguisher D can win the gqIND-qCPA
game with probability substantially better than guessing. We first transform the
game through a short game-hopping sequence into an indistinguishable game for
which we can bound the success probability of any such D.
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Game 0. This is the original gqIND-qCPA game.
Game 1. This is like Game 0, but instead of using a permutation drawn from
the qPRP family Πm+τ , a random permutation π ∈ S2m+τ is chosen from the
set of all permutations over {0, 1}m+τ . The difference in the success probability
of D winning one or the other of these two games is negligible. Otherwise, we
could use D to distinguish a random permutation drawn from Πm+τ from one
drawn from S2m+τ . This would contradict the assumption that Πm+τ is a qPRP.
Game 2. This is like Game 1, but D is guaranteed that the randomness used for
each encryption query are μ new random τ -bit strings that were not used before.
In other words, the challenger keeps track of all random values used so far and
excludes those when sampling a new randomness. Since in Game 1 the same
randomness is sampled twice only with negligible probability, the probability of
winning these two games differs by at most a negligible amount.
Game 3. This is like Game 2 except that the answer to each query asked by D
also contains the randomness r1, . . . , rμ used by the challenger for answering that
query. Clearly, D’s probability of winning this game is at least the probability
of winning Game 2.
When the modified gqIND game 3 starts, D chooses two different plaintext
states and sends them to the challenger, who will then choose one of them and
send it back encrypted with fresh randomness rˆ1, . . . , rˆμ. Let Q denote the set of
q · μ = poly(n) query values used during the previous qCPA-phase. We have to
consider that from this phase, D knows a set T ⊂ {0, 1}m+τ of ‘taken’ outputs,
i.e. he knows that any π(x‖rˆi) will not take one of these values as rˆi has not been
used before. So, from the adversary’s point of view, π is a permutation randomly
chosen from S′, the set of those permutations over {0, 1}m+τ that fix these |T |
values. In order to simplify the proof, we will consider a very conservative bound
where |T | = q · μ · 2m, and the size of S′ is |S′| = (2m+τ − |T |)! (notice that
this bound is very conservative because it assumes that the adversary learns 2m
different (classical) ciphertexts for every of the q · μ ‘taken’ randomnesses, but
as we will see, this knowledge will be still insufficient to win the game).
By construction, the encryption of a μm-qubit (possibly mixed) state σ is
performed in μ separate blocks of m qubits each. We are guaranteed that fresh
randomness is used in each block, hence it follows from Corollary 6.8 that Enck(σ)
is negligibly close to the ciphertext state where the first m+τ qubits are replaced
with the completely mixed state (by noting that |T |/2m = q · μ is polynomial
in n in our case, and hence the right-hand side of (3) is negligible). Another
application of Corollary 6.8 gives negligible closeness to the ciphertext state
where the first 2(m+τ) qubits are replaced with the completely mixed state etc.
After μ applications of Corollary 6.8, we have shown that Enck(σ) is negligibly
close to the totally mixed state on μ(m + τ) qubits. As this argument can be
made for any cleartext state σ, we have shown that from D’s point of view, all
encrypted states are negligibly close to the totally mixed state and therefore
cannot be distinguished. unionsq
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Corollary 6.10 (qIND-qCPA Security of Construction 6.6). If Πm+τ is a
family of quantum-secure pseudorandom permutations (qPRP), then the encryp-
tion scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) defined in Construction 6.6 is qIND-qCPA secure.
7 Conclusions and Further Directions
We believe that many of the current security notions used in different areas of
cryptography are unsatisfying in case quantum computers become reality. In this
respect, our work contributes to a better understanding of which properties are
important for the long-term security of modern cryptographic primitives. Our
work leads to many interesting follow-up questions.
There are many other directions to investigate, once the basic framework
of ‘indistinguishability versus semantic security’ presented in this work is com-
pleted. A natural direction is to look at quantum CCA1 security in this frame-
work. This topic was also initiated in [4] relative to the IND-qCPA model; it
would be interesting to extend the definition of CCA1 security to stronger notions
obtained by starting from our qIND-qCPA model.
In Sect. 3.3 we left open the interesting question on whether it is possible
at all to find a separating example between the notions of qIND and gqIND.
That is, find a symmetric-key encryption scheme E which is qIND-secure, but
not gqIND-secure. Finding such an example (or provable lack of) would shed
further light on the security model we consider.
We have so far not taken into account models where the adversary is allowed
to initialize the ancilla qubits used in the encryption operation used by the
challenger (i.e. the |y〉 in |x, y〉 → |x, y ⊕ Enck(x)〉). These models lead to the
study of quantum fault attacks, because they model cases where the adversary
is able to ‘watermark’ or tamper with part of the challenger’s internal memory.
Moreover, we have not considered superpositions of keys or randomness: these
lead to a quantum study of weak-key and bad-randomness models. The authors
of this paper are not aware of any results in these directions.
One outstanding open problem is to define CCA2 (adaptive chosen ciphertext
attack) security in the quantum world. The problem is that in the CCA2 game
the challenger has to ensure that the attacker does not ask for a decryption of
the actual challenge ciphertext leading to a trivial break. While this is easily
implemented in the classical world, it raises several issues in the quantum world.
What does it mean for a ciphertext to be different from the challenge ciphertext?
And, more importantly: How can the challenger check? There might be several
reasonable ways to solve the first issue but, as long as the queries are not classical,
we are not aware of any possibility to solve the second issue without disturbing
the challenge ciphertext and the query states.
Our secure construction shows how to turn block ciphers into qIND-qCPA
secure schemes. An interesting research question is whether there exists a general
patch transforming an IND-qCPA secure scheme into a qIND-qCPA secure one.
It is also important to study how our transformation can be applied to modes
of operation different from Construction 6.6.
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